The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute
SCHEDULE.
THURSDAY, 19. MAY 2016
8:30-9:30
Arrival, Coffee, Introductions
9:30-10:15
Thomas Hofweber: "Idealism and the limits of conceptual representation"
There is a plausible connection between the view that there are no ineffable facts on the one hand, and idealism on the other. On the natural way of understanding the connection, idealism is quite clearly false and ineffable facts are to be expected. However, there is also a different way this connection could obtain on which idealism is true and ineffable facts are ruled out in principle. I will defend this pair of views with an argument that comes mostly from the philosophy of language, and hope to show, despite talking mostly about language, that our minds are metaphysically central to reality. We are metaphysically special in reality as a whole even though we are simply complex material beings, and thinking about certain aspects of our own language can make that clear, or so I hope to argue.
10:15-11:00
Discussion
11:00-11:15
Coffee Break
11:15-12:00
Silvia Jonas: "Aesthetic Ineffability"
It has often been argued that aesthetic experiences are in some way ineffable and that attempts to express them constitute a ‘heresy of paraphrase.’ My talk specifies three kinds of questions that may be raised with regard to aesthetic ineffability: the first question concerns “technical” reasons for aesthetic ineffability, the second the uniformity of aesthetic ineffability across different perceptual contexts, and the third the meaningfulness of aesthetic ineffability. I will also address the question what kind of answer each of these questions requires. I then argue that, depending on which of these questions one is most interested in, different accounts are available, each one falling into one of two main categories: accounts that seek to locate aesthetic ineffability within the object of aesthetic experiences, that is, within aesthetic content, and accounts that seek to locate aesthetic ineffability within the subject of aesthetic experience. I argue that technical questions and questions of uniformity can be answered by both object-centred as well as subject-centred accounts, whereas the question of meaningfulness is best explained by a subject-centred account. This 3 should lead us to an overall preference for subject-centred accounts of aesthetic ineffability.
12:00-12:45
Discussion
13:00-14:00
Lunch
14:15-15:00
Guy Bennett-Hunter: "Ineffability and Contemporary Philosophy of Religion"
The concept of ineffability has received much of its (unjustly sparse) philosophical attention in the context of philosophy of religion. However, its implications for contemporary work in that discipline have been underestimated. After a brief definition of the concept of ineffability, this lecture sets out broadly the concept’s role in contemporary philosophy of religion. It then moves on to focus on two specific and closely related discussions, into which ineffability’s philosophical implications have been less than fully assimilated: the critique of ontotheology and religious pluralism. The lecture introduces some significant forthcoming work by scholars working in the John Hick Archives at the University of Birmingham, UK, which illuminates the decisive role that the concept of ineffability plays in Hick’s controversial pluralism. The lecture draws on this work to outline directions for future research in philosophy of religion which more fully realise ineffability’s implications.
15:00-15:45
Discussion
15:45-16:00
Coffee Break
16:00-16:45
James Shaw: "Some Remarks on Inexpressible Ignorance"
Shamik Dasgupta (forthcoming) argues that inexpressible ignorance is in principle quite pervasive, and would arise from certain haecceitist differences between worlds, “shifted” Newtonian spaces, and worlds that give rise to quidditistic variance. Most surprisingly, Dasgupta argues that these kinds of inexpressible ignorance would not involve ignorance of a proposition or fact. I investigate whether the cases Dasgupta discusses really do provide examples of inexpressible non-propositional ignorance, adding to the mix some further contrasting cases, including ‘orientational haecceities’ and cases of ordinary de re ignorance. My focus will be on understanding the phenomena from the perspective of a broadly Stalnakerian understanding of de re knowledge (and knowledge ascription). I'll explore, first, how such a theorist might see potential differences among some of Dasgupta’s cases, and second, how we might potentially safeguard the idea that all ignorance (expressible or not) is propositional in character.
16:45-17:30
Discussion
20:00
Workshop Dinner (invited guests only)